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Mental health advance statements: crossing the divide from clinical to law 
enforcement settings 
Introduction  
It is clear that police in many jurisdictions are increasingly being called out to 
situations involving persons with mental distress. In Scotland, for example, notifications of 
Place of Safety Orders to the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland increased from 130 in 
2006/2007 to 1133 in 2016/2017 (Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, 2018). Whilst 
this may reflect better police reporting (Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, 2018) and 
these figures only account for those persons assessed in Accident and Emergency 
departments and not elsewhere (McGeough and Foster, 2018) this nevertheless represents a 
significant increase. Aside from the wider question of the extent to which attending to the 
needs of persons in mental distress should fall to law enforcement agencies, particularly 
where no crime has been committed, it raises important issues concerning effective joint 
police and health service working.        
Appropriate and timely responses to persons in mental distress are essential. This 
results in better outcomes for the individual involved and greater confidence by clinicians and 
law enforcers that actions taken will lead to better support and service provision. Moreover, 
the requirement for effective responses are linked to realising international human rights such 
as, but not confined to, the rights to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health, to life, to liberty, autonomy, appropriate care, access to justice and to be free from 
abuse and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Elements of this requirement 
often find expression in ‘human rights-based approaches’ adopted by service providers 
including health bodies and police forces.    
Advance planning, in the form of mental health (or psychiatric) advance statements, 
or directives, are increasingly seen as assisting part of the shift towards greater autonomy in 
mental health care and treatment (Weller 2012; Stavert 2013). However, whilst their 
therapeutic benefits have been noted in clinical settings their usefulness where persons 
experiencing serious mental illness and mental health crises come into contact with law 
enforcement agencies remains much less unexplored, particularly from a human rights 
imperative perspective.   
This article will therefore consider the potential advantages and challenges presented 
by extending the scope of mental health advance statements to address the needs of persons 
in mental distress who come into contact with law enforcement agencies. In doing so, it will 
describe the relevant human rights framework requiring advance planning and consider the 
general issues related to the use of mental health advance statements as well as, in order to 
provide context, making some observations about current law and practice in Scotland. An 
awareness of the potential for use of advance statements in law enforcement situations, 
together with an appreciation of the current challenges related to this, will assist mental 
health professionals in exploring the development of their appropriate use for the benefit of 





Human rights imperatives and arguments 
Equality and non-discrimination in protection and rights enjoyment  
The importance of ensuring both personal and public protection whilst at the same 
time respecting the wishes of persons in mental distress on an equal and non-discriminatory 
basis with others has been a notable human rights development in recent years.  
In Europe, when interpreting the rights to liberty (Article 5) and to respect for private 
life (Article 8) identified in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the 
context of involuntary interventions the European Court of Human Rights has been 
increasingly emphasising the importance of respecting the autonomy of persons with mental 
disability (Shtukaturov v Russia (2012); Sykora v Czech Republic (2012); A-MV v Finland 
(2017).  This has included making it clear that even where a person’s lack of mental capacity 
justifies proxy decision-making due regard must still be afforded to that person’s views. A 
corresponding approach can be seen reflected by the Committee on Human Rights’ 
interpretation of the same rights identified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.   
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 
extends this requirement to ensure that the voice of a person with mental distress is always 
respected. Firstly, it adopts a social model of disability that interprets mental disability not in 
terms of a diagnosis and related impairment but rather in terms of resulting from state and 
societal obstacles that may hinder a person’s full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others (Article 1 CRPD). It is therefore possible to argue that ‘mental 
disability’ in the context of the CRPD can be interpreted as including both persons with a 
formal diagnosis of mental disorder and those without such a diagnosis but who are 
exhibiting possible underlying mental distress through, for example, actual or threatened self-
harm and intoxication.  
Secondly, the CRPD reminds us of the overarching international human rights 
principle that everyone, including those with mental disability, are entitled to enjoy all rights 
equally and without discrimination (Article 1 CRPD). This includes respect for autonomy, the 
right to life and to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and 
protection from harm and abuse. There are various elements to this. One is that states must 
ensure that there is access to support for persons experiencing difficulties with decision-
making and communicating their wishes, or ‘will and preferences’ (Article 12(4) CRPD), at 
any given time so that their wishes - or their legal capacity (an integral component of 
individual autonomy) - is respected on an equal basis with others (Articles 12(1)-(3) CRPD). 
Actions overriding such will and preferences would arguably only be permissible in order to 
prevent a civil or criminal wrong and must not be based on the existence of disability (Flynn 
and Arstein-Kerslake, 2017; Gooding and Flynn, 2015). Another element of this is that 
persons with mental disabilities must be protected from harm and abuse on an equal basis 
with others. This means that protective measures that prevent the person from exercising their 
rights are not justified where the risk of, or actual, harm arises from something or someone 
else or perceptions of risk or harm based on misconceptions associated with a person’s 
mental disability (Articles 5 (equality and non-discrimination) and 16 (freedom from 
exploitation, violence and abuse) CRPD; Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 2018).  
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Supporting and respecting the wishes of a person with mental distress equally with others 
The CRPD advocates that ensuring respect for the will and preferences of a person in 
mental distress can be achieved through providing access to support for the exercise of legal 
capacity (the ability to give legally enforceable effect to one’s decisions), often referred to as 
‘supported decision-making’ (tailored to individual needs) (Article 12(4) CRPD). However, 
there is also recognition that where it has been proven to be genuinely impossible to ascertain 
what these are then a best interpretation of the person’s will and preferences can be made 
(Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014).  
There is some academic and professional debate over whether support for the exercise 
of legal capacity and supported decision-making amount to the same concept, with the former 
being somewhat narrower in scope than the latter. However, for the purposes of this article 
they will be considered to be the same.    
The Committee on the Rights of Persons Disabilities, which is responsible for 
oversight of CRPD implementation by state parties to the treaty, has stated that such 
supported decision-making includes, amongst other things, advance planning (Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014). Mental health advance statements are 
generally regarded as a form of advance planning although, for the reasons discussed below, 
they may not currently fully comply with CRPD supported decision-making requirements. 
However, their potential in all situations where an individual may be unable to effectively 
communicate their wishes is nevertheless worthy of serious consideration.          
Mental health advance statements defined        
Mental health advance statements, also referred to, for example, as psychiatric 
advance directives or Ulysses contracts, have found expression in legislation and practice in 
several jurisdictions such as Scotland, England and Wales, the United States, India and 
Canada (Maylea et al, 2018).  Their form and content (particularly in terms of how directive 
of care and treatment they are) and the extent to which they legally bind both the maker and 
clinicians may differ between jurisdictions. However, broadly speaking they are documents 
that provide a means by which individuals can express their wishes in terms of their 
psychiatric care and treatment in the event that they are unable to communicate such wishes. 
Representing developments in international human rights law towards much stronger 
support for autonomy mental health advance statements are envisaged as ensuring that a 
person’s voice, expressing their authentic wishes, is communicated when it might be 
otherwise difficult for them to do this (Weller, 2012). They are an acknowledgement of 
respect for the fact that the individual concerned may often have the best knowledge of their 
needs and what works for them in times of crisis. Indeed, to ignore the wishes expressed in an 
advance statement which reflect an individual’s rights to autonomy, least restrictive 
interventions, respect for dignity and the right to health may arguably, and legitimately, result 
in claims of human rights violations (Stavert, 2013).   
     
Suggested benefits of mental health advance statements in clinical settings 
There is evidence to suggest that mental health advance statements yield several 
perceived benefits in psychiatric clinical settings, both in terms of patient experience and 
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patient-clinician relationships. These include improved experiences of clinical crises and 
planning for these (Ruchlewska et al, 2016), increased acceptance of medication (Wilder et 
al, 2010) and reduced use of coercion (Swanson et al, 2008; Morrissey, 2010).  
Indications also exist that mental health advance statements may be useful in assisting 
recovery and improving care through providing opportunities to support holistic experience 
approaches to recovery rather than focusing on clinical understandings of diagnosis and 
symptoms (Maylea et al, 2018; Deegan, 1996). This, coupled with the aforementioned 
increasing human rights emphasis on autonomy and equality and non-discrimination in rights 
enjoyment in all spheres of the lives of persons with mental disability, suggest the potential 
for extending the use of mental health advance statements beyond clinical settings to 
encompass cross-agency working including law enforcement bodies. That being said, despite 
these attributes several challenges exist in this respect which will now be considered.  
Challenges for mental health advance statements beyond clinical settings  
There are a number of existing challenges concerning mental health advance 
statements which remain to be addressed before or in addition to their use beyond clinical 
environments.    
Despite the perceived benefits of mental health advance statements there nevertheless 
does appear to be low uptake by persons with mental disability as well as a general lack of 
awareness of their existence or scope (Morriss et al, 2017; Maylea et al, 2018). Given that 
most are entered into after a previous episode or episodes of mental distress this might be a 
reflection of the desire not to revisit these episodes. However, it is arguable that this might be 
ameliorated to some extent if the making of mental health advance statements were part of 
routine health care planning. 
A lack of knowledge about advance statements and related rights, and clinical and 
other support for their making (Morriss et al, 2017) as well as perceived sense of futility 
relating to their legal weight may also explain the low engagement (Stavert, 2013). Indeed, in 
many cases, subject to various criteria, it is possible for clinical teams and tribunals to 
override wishes expressed in mental health advance statements (Maylea et al, 2018). Under 
the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, for instance, all decisions about 
psychiatric care and treatment must be cognisant of the Act’s human rights informed general 
human rights principles. The Mental Health Tribunal and clinicians must also have regard to 
the care and treatment wishes expressed in an advance statement. However, it is possible to 
override these wishes, provided the legislative and human rights principles are followed and 
the decision to do so is justified and appropriately recorded (Sections 275-276 Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003).      
A further issue in advance planning, and in particular psychiatric advance statements, 
is their traditional linkage with mental capacity assessments. They are made when a person 
has capacity to do so and come into effect only after they lose mental capacity. This creates 
the potential to not only lock someone into treatment decisions and wishes expressed earlier 
but which may have changed in the interim (Maylea et al, 2018). It also does not necessarily 
provide an assurance of respect for the treatment wishes of a person who may still be 
assessed as having mental capacity but who is experiencing difficulty expressing those 
preferences as a result of mental distress.  
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These concerns are reflected by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in its interpretation of Article 12 CRPD (equal recognition before the law). It 
makes it clear that in order to ensure the non-discriminatory exercise of legal capacity “The 
point at which an advance directive enters into force (and ceases to have effect) should be 
decided by the person and included in the text of the directive; it should not be based on an 
assessment that the person lacks mental capacity.” (Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 2014).  This is a serious consideration for those states who are parties to the 
CRPD who are contemplating introducing advance planning mechanisms or have already 
adopted such measures but which are aligned to mental capacity assessments.  It is, however,  
suggested that as the CRPD requires ensuring a focus on ascertaining and giving effect to the 
authentic will and preferences of individuals in mental distress, using the supported decision-
making and ‘best interpretations’ approaches, the solution may lie more in working to 
ascertain an individual’s authentic wishes at any given time by considering their well-
established and overriding values.   
The cross-agency sharing of personal information can present significant issues. That 
being said there is already evidence of existing inter-health and law enforcement agency 
sharing of patient information (for example, linkage systems in the United States). Moreover, 
as the making of an advance statement is in the discretion its maker it is entirely compatible 
with Article 12 CRPD requirements for respect for autonomous decision making if the maker 
agrees to the sharing of its content. That being said, the nature and scope of such information 
sharing would have to be made very clear.  
The resourcing implications of such cross-agency arrangements and potential increase 
in uptake of mental health advance statements are an additional factor to be considered. 
However, it might be argued that this more an issue of reallocation rather than increased 
resources with savings for all agencies in terms of use of emergency or acute provision being 
a result.  
Conclusion   
It is acknowledged that mental health advance statements will not cover every 
eventuality when a person experiences mental distress. However, it may complement other 
forms of support and enablement. The potential for the extension of the use of mental health 
psychiatric advance statements from clinical to law enforcement agencies to achieve better 
outcomes therefore clearly needs to be further explored.  
More empirical research as to how and what would work is required and, equally, 
legal enforceability and institutional ‘buy in’ is essential. However, as discussed, there is a 
strong human rights imperative, notably stemming from the CRPD, for this.  The ability to 
effectively give effect to the CRPD requirements reinforcing such an approach within 
individual states will depend on their constitutional and political approaches to international 
human rights treaties. However, the over 170 states which have ratified the CRPD have, at 
the very least, an international law obligation to give effect to it nationally and, indeed, many 
states are seeking to accommodate it within their policies and law reform.  
The extended use of mental health advance statements also provide opportunities to 
improve practice under existing legislation. In Scotland, for example, they could be used to 
support improved and appropriate use of ‘Place of Safety’ provisions in the Mental Health 
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(Care and Treatment)(Scotland) Act 2003 (section 297). These provide that if a police officer 
reasonably suspects that someone in a public place has a mental disorder and is in immediate 
need of care and treatment the officer can, in the person’s interest of for the protection of 
others,  remove that person to a ‘place of safety’ where they can be kept for up to 24 hours. A 
‘Place of Safety’ is defined as being as hospital, care home, or any other suitable place 
willing to take the person temporarily (section 300). Amongst other things, in its most recent 
place of safety monitoring report the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland has 
recommended that “…to improve mental health outcomes for people in the justice system, 
and to respond better to distress, the Scottish Government and local agencies should develop 
models of service for people who are acutely distressed but do not require detention under the 
Mental Health Act.” (Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, 2018).  
The Act and its Code of Practice emphasises that police stations should only be used 
as Places of Safety in exceptional circumstances and for only so long as no other place of 
safety is immediately available. Moreover, in the above-mentioned report the Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland noted the very low number of persons who were taken to a Place of 
Safety but who were subsequently detained under mental health legislation. For instance, 
seventy-nine per cent had no orders under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) 
Act 2003 in the period of two months before and two months after the Place of Safety 
intervention. This is highly suggestive of the fact that although the person concerned is highly 
distressed other interventions or measures are required in these circumstances. Mental health 
advance statements may be the means by which to provide guidance on what works best for 
the person concerned and thus have value here.    
 The ability to give effect to the CRPD requirements reinforcing such an extended use 
of mental health advance statements approach within individual states will depend on their 
constitutional and political approaches to international human rights treaties. However, states 
that have ratified the CRPD have, at the very least, an international law obligation to give 
effect to it nationally and, indeed, many states are seeking to accommodate it within their 
policies and law reform.Recent law reviews and reforms in Australia, England and Wales and 
Scotland are examples of this. 
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